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1. Introduction 
1.1 Topic  
The remote archipelago of Svalbard is situated in the northernmost part of Norway. Before the 
recognition of Norwegian sovereignty in the Svalbard Treaty,
1
 it was one of the few areas left 
in the world still considered a no man’s land. For decades the Treaty has been a source of 
controversy between Norway and other states. The most disputed question concern the 
geographical and material scope of the Treaty’s prohibition against discrimination as newer 
legal constructions have complicated interpretation of the Treaty. Notably, modern law of the 
sea allows for coastal states to establish maritime zones outside their territories, which gives 
them sovereignty in territorial waters and sovereign rights to explore and exploit both living 
and non-living resources in the areas beyond. Thus, in maritime zones, the state may 
discriminate other nationalities and favour its own nationals. In contrast, the Svalbard Treaty 
prohibits discrimination based on nationality in conducting certain economic activities. The 
question is thus which regime applies to the maritime zones around Svalbard, and how the 
regimes shall be harmonised. To this day, Norway has been able to prevent serious 
confrontation by limiting exploitation of resources to the temporary and non-discriminatory 
Fishery Protection Zone (FPZ).
2
 Although Norway maintains that the Svalbard Treaty is not 
applicable in this zone, non-discriminatory regulations apply
3
 in order to prevent the 
controversial issues of the Svalbard Treaty being put to the test. 
There is a considerable body of existing literature on the law of the sea dimension of 
the spatial and material scope of the Svalbard Treaty. However, less is written on how 
Norwegian law has dealt with these challenges. Since Norway is the coastal state as related to 
the Svalbard archipelago it is particularly interesting to look at Norwegian state practice. 
Three cases have been heard by the Norwegian Supreme Court, where the appellants claimed 
discriminatory treatment in the FPZ. So far, attempts to make the Court decide on the 
geographical scope of the Treaty have proved futile. However, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly discussed the non-discrimination requirement of the Svalbard Treaty, in order to 
establish whether or not there have been cases of discrimination in the FPZ. This thesis will 
                                                          
1
 Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great 
Britain and Ireland and the British overseas Dominions and Sweden concerning Spitsbergen signed in Paris 9th 
February 1920 (also known as ‘The 1920 Treaty of Paris’ or the ‘Spitsbergen Treaty’). See also Act of 18 July 
1925 No. 11 (‘The Svalbard Act’). 
2
 Royal Decree of 3 June 1977 No. 6 on the Fisheries Protection Zone off Svalbard, pursuant to §1 of the Act of 
17 December 1976 No. 9 on Norway’s Economic Zone. 
3
 Report No. 30 to the Norwegian Storting (2004-2005) ‘Muligheter og utfordringer i nord’, section 3.3. 
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pay particular attention to the 2014 ‘Kiel’ case.4 This judgment is especially interesting, as the 
Supreme Court seems to have been influenced by developments in European law, in its 
interpretation of the non-discrimination requirement of the Svalbard Treaty.  
1.2 Research Question 
My overall research question is how the Norwegian Supreme Court has dealt with the 
questions of the geographical and material scope of the Svalbard Treaty’s non-discrimination 
requirement. Answering this question requires a two-fold approach. In the first part of this 
thesis I will place emphasis on the international legal framework in the Svalbard Treaty and 
interpret legal aspects related to the Treaty’s geographical application and the content of the 
Treaty’s non-discrimination requirement. The second part of the thesis will address how these 
questions have been dealt with at the national level, focusing on decisions by the Norwegian 
Supreme Court. 
1.3 Method and Legal Sources 
The starting point for establishing international rules of law is the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ),
5
 which is generally recognised as an authoritative statement on sources 
of international of law. The main source of law analysed in this thesis will be the Svalbard 
Treaty, which is an ‘international convention’, pursuant to article 38 (a) of the ICJ Statute. 
The French and English texts of the Svalbard Treaty are equally authentic.
6
 Furthermore, the 
discipline of treaty interpretation has been codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT).
7
 Norway is not a party to VCLT. However, the ICJ has recognised that 
articles 31-32 are expressions of customary international law.
8
 In Kasikili/Sedudu,
9
 the ICJ 
established that this was the case as early as in 1890. As Norway is bound by customary 
international law, VCLT will provide guidance for the interpretation of the 1920 Svalbard 
Treaty. Other sources of international law will be the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS)
10
 and case law, notably decisions from the ICJ.   
National court practice and literature are supplementary sources of international law, 
according to ICJ Statute article 38 (d). These can hold persuasive authority. The writings of 
                                                          
4
 Rt. 2014 p. 272. 
5
 UN, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946. 
6
 Article 10 (3) of the Svalbard Treaty. 
7
 UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS, Vol. 1155, p. 331. 
8
 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2002, p. 625, and 
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau/Senegal), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1991, p. 53, para. 48. 
9
 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1999, p. 1045, para. 18. 
10
 UN, Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December, 1982, UNTS, Vol. 1833, p. 397. 
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legal scholars can enlighten the discussion, as there has been much debate on the content of 
the Svalbard Treaty provisions. Central scholars include Fleischer,
11
 who holds the position 
that the Svalbard Treaty does not apply to the maritime zones around Svalbard, and Ulfstein 
and Churchill,
12
 who defend the opposite view. As regards other national sources, these 
include Norwegian laws, regulations and Supreme Court decisions, which will be analysed in 
accordance with the Norwegian doctrine on legal sources. In addition, reports by the Storting 
will be used in order to establish the official positions of Norway.  
 Challenges of interpretation include the fact that the Svalbard Treaty is almost 100 
years old and its provisions are sometimes vaguely articulated. The difficulties regarding the 
interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty have occurred decades after the conclusion of the Treaty, 
making it more troublesome to establish the intention of the drafters. Another challenge is that 
one cannot with certainty establish all positions and arguments of other States on the matter of 
the interpretation of the Treaty. There have been no legal proceedings where the States have 
advocated their views. However, several governments have issued statements that indicate 
their positions regarding the interpretation of the Treaty, making it possible to discuss 
potential arguments that can be put forward in order to support these views.   
1.4 Outline 
After this introductory chapter, the following chapter will provide a historical backdrop 
relating to the Svalbard Treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. In order to fully grasp 
the legal problems, it is vital to understand the special situation of Svalbard both before and 
after the Svalbard Treaty was concluded and came into force. Chapter 3 will be dedicated to 
the discussion on the topical and complex issue of the Svalbard Treaty’s geographical 
application. This will provide a background for the more specific question that will be 
discussed in chapter 4, namely the content of the non-discrimination requirement. I will 
interpret articles 2 and 3 of the Svalbard Treaty in order to establish what these non-
discrimination provisions entail. The interpretation will be focused around elements that are 
relevant to the Norwegian Supreme Court cases that will be analysed in chapter 5. Chapter 5 
will then bring us to the central question of this thesis, which is how the Norwegian Supreme 
Court has dealt with the questions of the Svalbard Treaty’s area of application and the non-
discriminatory regulations applied in the FPZ.  
                                                          
11
 See generally Carl August Fleischer, Folkerett, 8th edition, Oslo 2005, chapter 12. 
12
 See generally Geir Ulfstein, The Svalbard Treaty: From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty, Oslo 1995, 
pp. 478-479 and Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘The Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard’, in 
Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea, Leiden 2010, pp. 551-593. 
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2. The Svalbard Treaty and the Development of the Law of 
the Sea 
2.1 The History of the Svalbard Treaty 
2.1.1 Norwegian Sovereignty 
Svalbard was discovered by the Dutch explorer William Barents in 1596,
13
 who named the 
archipelago ‘Spitsbergen’. Russia and England have also claimed to be the discoverers of the 
archipelago,
14
 although it has been suggested that Norsemen found the land centuries earlier 
and referred to it as ‘Svalbard’, meaning ‘cold shores’.15 Throughout history there has been an 
international presence on the archipelago, through various commercial activities, such as 
whaling, fur trapping and mining. For a long time, however, the archipelago was considered a 
no man’s land.  
An international management regime for Svalbard was discussed in a sequence of 
conferences in Norway’s capital in 1910, 1912 and 1914.16 However, these talks were 
interrupted by the outbreak of World War I. As a consequence, attempts to establish 
Svalbard’s status proved unsuccessful until the post-war peace negotiations. At this time, 
France, England and the USA were instrumental in designing the new power balance in 
Europe. In spite of Norway’s neutrality during the war, the Norwegian merchant fleet had 
been of service to the Western powers, and also suffered collateral damage as a result of the 
war.
17
 These were among the arguments used to advocate for Norwegian sovereignty over 
Svalbard. It is worth noting that although Russia and Germany were both active participants 
in the conferences prior to the war, this was not the case in the negotiations in its aftermath. 
However, both States later signed and ratified the Svalbard Treaty.
18
   
During the negotiations culminating in the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, there were two main 
proposals.
19
 One of them would assign Norway a mere managerial or administrative role on 
behalf of the international community. However, this suggestion was rejected in favour of full 
Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. The previous terra nullius regime had led to over-
exploitation of resources and conflict between the different nationalities, leading to a need for 
                                                          
13
 Ulfstein 1995, op. cit,. p. 35. 
14
 Ibid., p. 34. 
15
 T.B. Arlov, ‘Nytt lys over Svalbards oppdagelse?’, Heimen, 1987 XXIV, No. 2, p. 78, as cited in ibid., p. 33. 
16
 Øystein Jensen, Noreg og havets folkerett, Trondheim 2014, pp. 99. 
17
 See generally, Ulfstein 1995, op. cit. pp. 44-49. 
18
 Ibid., p. 46. 
19
 Fleischer 2005, op. cit. p. 136-137. 
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proper management.
20
 By giving sovereignty to a single state, the Treaty parties aimed to 
allow for proper regulations of the resources on the archipelago, as well as their peaceful 
utilisation. At the same time, the Svalbard Treaty granted the signatory powers certain rights 
and advantages in conducting economic activity on the archipelago. These requirements were 
meant to preserve certain terra nullius rights for the signatory States.
21
 In sections 3 and 4 
below, we shall see that this aim is mirrored in the preamble and separate provisions of the 
Svalbard Treaty.  
2.1.2 Key Provisions 
The most important provisions of the Svalbard Treaty include, first, restrictions in introducing 
duties and taxes on the archipelago, as the revenue can only be used for local purposes.
22
 
Further, there is a ban on using the archipelago for war purposes or other specific military 
activities.
23
 Third, the nationals from all signatory States have equal liberty of access and 
entry to the archipelago.
24
 Lastly - and most relevant to the topic of this thesis - is the non-
discrimination requirement, which according to the wording of the Treaty applies to certain 
specified activities.
25
  
The most controversial element of the Svalbard Treaty has proven to be the 
geographical and material scope of this non-discrimination requirement. The problematic part 
concerning its geographical scope is that wording of the Treaty only explicitly mentions the 
land territory and the territorial waters. It is uncontroversial that the non-discrimination 
provisions apply in these areas. However, the question is if non-discrimination is also required 
in the new maritime zones beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea. The material problem 
is related to the incongruity between the non-discrimination requirements of the Treaty and 
the exclusive coastal state rights provided by the modern law of the sea.  
As of today, there are over 40 signatories to the Svalbard Treaty. All of these 
signatories enjoy rights of non-discrimination in undertaking activities on Svalbard, such as 
hunting, fishing and mining. Accordingly, Norway is prohibited from treating subjects from 
any signatory State, including Norway, more favourably than subjects of other signatory 
                                                          
20
 Ulfstein 1995, op. cit., pp. 36-38. 
21
 Ibid., p. 50, or alternatively ‘preserve the status quo’, see Peter T. Ørebech ‘The long arm reach’ of the 
Svalbard Treaty?’ From the Selected Works of Peter T Orebech, 2015. Available at: <http:// 
works.bepress.com/peter_orebech/1> accessed 2 December 2015. 
22
 Article 8 (2) of the Svalbard Treaty. 
23
 Ibid., article 9. 
24
 Ibid., article 3 (1). 
25
 Ibid., articles 2 and 3. 
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States. Thus, scholars have compared the Svalbard Treaty system to contemporary EU law.
26
 
A difference worth noting is that Svalbard is not bound to adopt policies decided by any 
supranational organ. The Svalbard Treaty regime is nevertheless indeed similar in the respect 
that Norway has sovereignty over the territory, but cannot discriminate based on nationality.  
2.2 Development of the Law of the Sea 
At the time the Svalbard Treaty was signed in 1920, no one could foresee the complex legal 
questions that due to the development of the law of the sea would later emerge with respect to 
the maritime zones beyond the territorial waters of Svalbard. Traditionally, the oceans were 
considered a global common. This doctrine of the freedom of the seas is articulated most 
famously by Hugo Grotius in his work ‘Mare Liberum’ of 1609. The oceans were not 
considered to belong to any one state, but were free to use by all. For centuries, the exception 
to this doctrine was a relatively small area close to the shore of a coastal state, called the 
territorial sea.
27
 In the territorial sea, the coastal state enjoyed sovereignty, similar to that on 
land.  
Later developments in the law of the sea have, however, led to an expansion of the 
territorial sea, as well as the creation of new maritime zones beyond. After the Second World 
War,
28
 coastal states began declaring maritime zones beyond their territorial waters for 
specific purposes such as fishing or protecting the environment. The right to establish these 
zones became customary international law and was also codified in different conventions, 
most recently in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
While the territorial sea is a part of a state’s territory, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the 
continental shelf only establish sovereign rights for the coastal state to explore and exploit 
marine resources. In the remainder of this chapter, I will present an outline of the maritime 
zones relevant to Svalbard, before highlighting the different character of the Svalbard Treaty 
and the modern law of the sea.  
2.2.1 The Continental Shelf 
Firstly, the continental shelf contains rights to resources on the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas to a distance of 200 nautical miles (nm) from the baselines from which the 
                                                          
26
 Ulfstein 1995, op. cit., p. 474, Flesicher, op.cit., p. 137 and Aage Thor Falkanger, ‘Noen folkerettslige 
problemstillinger i nordområdene – i fortid og nåtid’, Lov og Rett, 2007, pp. 323 and 336. 
27
 Potentially also an area outside the territorial sea similar to the modern contiguous zone, see Churchill and 
Ulfstein op. cit., p. 564 and Ørebech op. cit., p. 43. 
28
 Notably, President Truman’s proclamation of exclusive jurisdiction outside the territorial sea of the USA, 
September 1945. 
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territorial sea is measured, and, if the continental margin in question allows, beyond that 
distance.
29
 Thus, a coastal state has the right to a continental shelf extending 200 nm 
regardless of the geological configuration of the seabed, but in some cases the coastal State 
can, in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS, establish the outer limits of the shelf at a 
much more seaward position.  
 The key problematic issue in relation to the Svalbard Treaty as related to the 
continental shelf regime of the law of the sea is whether or not the rules apply to the 
continental shelf around Svalbard. Geologically the continental shelf around the Norwegian 
mainland and Svalbard is the same shelf. However, as will be discussed in section 3.1.3, this 
does not necessarily exclude the application of the Svalbard Treaty on the part of the 
continental shelf that is situated around the archipelago. It is noted that in the procedures for 
establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2009 agreed with Norway that there 
indeed is a continental shelf around the archipelago.
30
 
There is currently no petroleum activity on the continental shelf around Svalbard.
31
 
However, if the Svalbard Treaty did apply here, this could greatly affect any prospects of tax 
income from potential future petroleum activities. While petroleum activity on the mainland 
continental shelf of Norway generates large revenue for the Norwegian state, a similar 
solution on the shelf around Svalbard may be prohibited by the Svalbard Treaty’s tax 
restrictions.
32
  
2.2.2 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Fishery Protection Zone (FPZ) 
The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea.
33
 It extends seawards no longer 
than 200 nm from the territorial sea baselines.
34
 Article 56, 1 (a) of UNCLOS provides that 
the EEZ gives the coastal State ‘sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil (...)’. In contrast to the continental 
                                                          
29
 Articles 76-77 of UNCLOS.  
30
 See generally Øystein Jensen, 'Towards Setting the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic: On the 
Norwegian Submission and Recommendations of the Commission'. In Davor Vidas (ed), Law, Technology and 
Science for Oceans in Globalisation – IUU Fishing, Oil Pollution, Bioprospecting, Outer Continental Shelf. 
Leiden/Boston 2010, pp. 519-538. 
31
 Although Russia has protested against Norwegian licencing rounds, which the Russian Authorities believe to 
concern areas regulated by the Svalbard Treaty. See article in Verdens Gang (VG) : 
<http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/norsk-politikk/russland-protesterer-mot-oljeboring-i-svalbard-
sonen/a/23444540/> accessed 17 November 2015. 
32
 Article 8 (2) of the Svalbard Treaty. 
33
 Article 55 of UNCLOS.  
34
 Article 57 of UNCLOS.  
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shelf, which gives the coastal state the exclusive right to exploit resources only at the seabed 
and subsoil, the EEZ gives rights also with respect to living marine resources in the water 
column above the seabed. There is no obligation to establish an EEZ, but in contrast to the 
continental shelf it shall be explicitly proclaimed by a State if it wishes to make use of its 
sovereign rights in this area. With respect to the water beyond the territorial waters of 
Svalbard, the Norwegian official position is that Norway can establish an EEZ around 
Svalbard, in accordance with UNCLOS.
35
 So far, however, only a non-discriminatory Fishery 
Protection Zone has been established. 
 The Svalbard FPZ has been in operation for almost 40 years and is currently the only 
maritime zone outside Svalbard where there is commercial activity. The FPZ was introduced 
in 1977, with a purpose to conserve and manage the marine living resources in the area.
36
 
There is no mention of an FPZ in UNCLOS. However, Norway considers the legal basis for 
the establishment of an FPZ to be customary international law, as it was established before 
Norway ratified UNCLOS.
37
 In the FPZ, non-discriminatory regulations are applied in order 
to avoid confrontation with other states, as well as seeing no need for differential treatment in 
this area.
38
  
 It is worth noting that these ‘self-imposed restrictions’ do not mean that all Treaty 
parties are given equal quotas to fish in the FPZ, or even a right to fish at all. Norway and 
Russia’s fisheries cooperation on shared and straddling fish stocks, involve a yearly 
agreement on a common Total Allowable Catch (TAC) on specific fisheries.
39
 The TAC is set 
for the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea, including the FPZ around Svalbard. In other 
words, Norwegians and Russians do not have own quotas on these fish stocks in the FPZ, but 
fish on their respective part of the TAC, regardless of whether this happens in the FPZ, 
Russian EEZ or Norwegian EEZ. In addition, certain third countries are given quotas on 
specific fisheries in the FPZ if they have historical fishing practice in the area. In reality, this 
leaves out the majority of the Treaty parties. This arrangement, as well as other details 
regarding the management of the FPZ, will be discussed in more detail in chapters 4-5, on the 
non-discrimination requirement and its content.    
                                                          
35
 Pursuant to §3 of the Act on Norway’s Economic Zone of 17 December 1976 No. 91, there is a prohibition on 
fishing for non-Norwegians in Norway’s EEZ. However, §2 of the Royal Decree of 3 June 1977 No. 6 on the 
Fisheries Protection Zone off Svalbard provides that this provision temporarily does not apply to the FPZ. 
36
 Royal Decree of 1977, op. cit., § 1. 
37
 See reference to preparatory works for the regulations cited in Rt. 2006 p. 1498, para. 54. 
38
 Report No. 40 to the Norwegian Storting (1985-86), ‘Concerning Svalbard’, unofficial translation, p. 11. 
39
 E.J. Molenaar, ‘Fisheries Regulations in the Maritime Zones of Svalbard’, The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 27, Leiden 2012, pp. 3-58 (pp. 36-40). 
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2.3 The Different Character of the Regimes 
To this day, Norway has not opened for petroleum activity on the continental shelf, nor 
established an EEZ. The only commercial activity is currently in the FPZ. It is important to 
note that the maritime zones are not extensions of coastal state territory, but give the state 
sovereign rights in these areas. In other words, the UNCLOS regime gives exclusive rights for 
the coastal state to explore and exploit resources in its maritime zones. The modern law of the 
sea thus allows for the state to discriminate in its territorial sea, over which it has sovereignty, 
as well as in the maritime zones beyond the territorial sea, where the state enjoys sovereign 
rights. In contrast, the Svalbard Treaty prohibits Norway from discriminating nationals of any 
of the Treaty parties in economic activities regulated by the Treaty. This underlines the 
different character of UNCLOS and the Svalbard Treaty, and raises the question of which 
legal regime applies to the maritime zones around the archipelago.  
The wording of the Svalbard Treaty provisions makes it clear that the Treaty applies 
on land and in the territorial waters. However, in 1920, the territorial sea was the only 
maritime zone in existence. The sea was either territory or open seas. After the Treaty was 
concluded, however, there has been a significant development in the law of the sea. Thus, 
there is also a geographical discrepancy between the Svalbard Treaty and the modern law of 
the sea.  
3. The Geographical Scope of the Svalbard Treaty 
3.1 Can Norway Establish Maritime Zones Beyond Svalbard’s 
Territorial Sea?   
3.1.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter identified the main challenges to the interpretation of the Svalbard 
Treaty, due to the different nature of the Treaty and the modern law of the sea. It was 
established that the main dispute is related to the material and geographical scope of the 
Treaty. Section 3.1 of this chapter will investigate whether Svalbard generates maritime zones 
at all. In section 3.2, there will be a discussion on whether the Svalbard Treaty applies in these 
maritime zones.  
12 
 
3.1.2 Does the Svalbard Treaty Exclude the Establishment of Maritime Zones Beyond 
the Territorial Sea? 
In the past, Russia and its forerunner The Soviet Union have advocated that Norway has no 
right to establish maritime zones beyond the territorial waters of Svalbard.
40
 It can be argued 
that Russia’s argument has been weakened during the last few years. In 2010 Russia entered 
into a delimitation agreement with Norway with respect to both continental shelf areas and 
sea areas,
41
 and thus accepted the use of the baselines of Svalbard as the base for the 
delimitation line. Other parties are either silent on the matter
42
 or they seem to accept 
Norway’s right to establish maritime zones outside Svalbard’s territorial waters, as long as the 
Svalbard Treaty applies in these areas.
43
 The claim that the Svalbard Treaty applies in the 
maritime zones, will in itself imply an acceptance that such zones can be established. Thus 
also State practice indicates that Norway has the right establish maritime zones around 
Svalbard, which is also the conclusion here.  
It is unproblematic to establish that there is a territorial sea around Svalbard, in which 
the Svalbard Treaty applies. Article 1 provides that the Treaty parties recognise Norwegian 
sovereignty over Svalbard, comprising all islands within specific coordinates. Provisions of 
the Svalbard Treaty repeatedly refer to the ‘territorial waters’ and stipulate rights for the 
Treaty parties in this zone.
44
 At the time of the conclusion of the Treaty, the wording 
‘territorial waters’ referred to an area that was not clearly defined in size. However, the term 
is generic and must be understood as having the same content as territorial sea, which is the 
term most commonly used today, including in UNCLOS and other instruments. 
No other types of maritime zones are explicitly mentioned by the Treaty. This seems 
only natural, however, as they did not exist as legal constructs at the time of the Svalbard 
Treaty’s creation. On the other hand, there are no provisions that prohibit the establishment of 
such maritime zones. Norway’s rights as a sovereign state should therefore come into play, 
including the right to establish maritime zones in accordance with customary international law 
and UNCLOS. Notably, according to UNCLOS article 121, islands are entitled to maritime 
                                                          
40
 The Soviet Union, Memorandum to Norway, 27 August 1970, as cited in Tore Henriksen and Torbjørn 
Pedersen ‘Svalbard’s Maritime Zones: The End of Legal Uncertainty?’ in The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 24, 2009, pp. 141–161 (p. 144). 
41
Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean 15 Sept 2010. 
42
Including France, Germany and the USA, see Torbjørn Pedersen, Conflict and Order in Svalbard Waters, 
Tromsø 2008 p. 7, with further reference to ‘The Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy’ in Diplomacy and Statecraft 
2008, 19, No. 2, chapter 7. 
43
The United Kingdom has explicitly stated its view in Note Verbale of 11 March 2006, by the British 
Government to the Government of Norway, British Yearbook of International Law 78, 2007, p. 794. 
44
 Including articles 2-3 of the Svalbard Treaty. 
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zones. An exception stipulated by article 121 (3) is ‘[r]ocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own’. Those parts of Svalbard that constitute such ‘rocks’ 
are situated in such a way that they would not greatly impact the size of the maritime zones of 
Svalbard.
45
 Under international law, Svalbard therefore generates its own maritime zones.  
3.1.3 Does Svalbard Generate its ‘Own’ Continental Shelf? 
Traditionally, Norway has argued that the continental shelf around Svalbard needs to be 
discussed separately from other zones such as the FPZ or an EEZ. This is because Norway 
considers these zones and the continental shelf to be generated by different land territories. 
Norway has maintained that the continental shelf around Svalbard is not a continental shelf 
extending from the Svalbard archipelago, but an extension of the continental shelf generated 
by the Norwegian mainland.
46
 As a consequence of this, it has been held by Norway that the 
Svalbard Treaty does not apply to the continental shelf around Svalbard. However, this claim 
has led to protests from other states.
47
 
It is worth mentioning that there has been an inconsistency in Norway’s practice as to 
whether Svalbard has its own continental shelf or not, as Svalbard has been the base of other 
claims in relation to the law of the sea. Norway’s claim that Svalbard generates an FPZ, but 
not a continental shelf, is in itself contradictory. In addition, basepoints on Svalbard was used 
for calculating the equidistance in the 2006 delimitation agreement with 
Denmark/Greenland.
48
 Moreover, Svalbard was used for delimiting the continental shelf in 
the 2010 delimitation agreement with Russia.  
As pointed out by Churchill and Ulfstein,
49
 the argument that Svalbard does not 
generate its own continental shelf seems to have been downplayed by Norway in recent years, 
as it has not been mentioned in newer documents on Svalbard. They also suggest that 
Norway’s recent practice may not be a contradiction of the Norwegian position, but rather a 
confirmation that this argument has been abandoned.  
There are few good reasons to accept that the continental shelf around Svalbard cannot 
be regulated by the Svalbard Treaty because it is geologically the same shelf as that of the 
Norwegian mainland. As shown, every island except uninhabitable rocks generates maritime 
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zones. Therefore, under UNCLOS, Svalbard generates its own continental shelf. Besides, it 
must be decisive that the arguments in favour of Svalbard having an own continental shelf are 
not necessarily referring to a physically separate continental shelf. Rather, Svalbard may have 
its own continental shelf in the respect that a specific part of the seabed extending from the 
archipelago is subject to the provisions of the Svalbard Treaty. The mere fact that the shelf 
around Svalbard is geologically the same as that of the Norwegian mainland does not prohibit 
this. Thus, it could well be argued that Svalbard has its own continental shelf, referring to a 
zone of seabed outside its territorial waters that is regulated by the Treaty. Therefore, the 
maritime zones will be discussed jointly in the following section on the geographical scope of 
the Treaty. 
3.2 Does the Svalbard Treaty Apply in the Maritime Zones 
Beyond the Territorial Sea? 
3.2.1 Introduction 
As for the most disputed legal question of today, Norway maintains that the Treaty only 
applies on land and in the territorial waters.
50
 Canada and Finland have previously supported 
the Norwegian view, but it is not currently clear whether this support has been withdrawn.
51
  
Germany, France and the USA are among states who have not voiced their opinion on the 
matter. As mentioned, most other Treaty Parties are of the opinion that the Treaty also applies 
to other maritime zones generated by the Svalbard territory.  
Iceland and Spain seem to accept that Norway can establish maritime zones beyond 
the territorial sea of Svalbard, but have challenged her enforcement jurisdiction in the FPZ.
52
 
However, if the Svalbard Treaty applies in these maritime zones, there is nothing in the Treaty 
that prohibits Norway from enforcing its regulations. On the contrary, article 2 (2) provides 
that ‘shall be free to maintain, take or decree suitable measures to ensure the preservation (…) 
of the fauna and flora’. If the economic rights enjoyed by the signatories of the Svalbard 
Treaty apply in the maritime zones beyond the territorial sea, then naturally so will also 
Norway’s right to exercise jurisdiction. Similarly, if the Treaty does not apply in these zones, 
Norway will enjoy normal coastal state jurisdiction. Because there does not seem to be legal 
merit to these claims by Iceland and Spain, they will not be discussed further within this 
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thesis. In the following, the discussion will be focused on whether or not the Treaty applies to 
the maritime zones outside Svalbard’s territorial sea. 
3.2.2 Text 
Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention provides that a treaty shall be interpreted ‘in good 
faith’ ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning’ given to the terms of the treaty. It is 
Norway’s official view that the Treaty provisions only apply to the areas expressly mentioned 
in the Treaty, namely the land areas covered by article 1, as well as the territorial waters.
53
 In 
Report No. 40 to the Norwegian Storting (1985-86), it was maintained that: 
 
According to the wording of the Svalbard Treaty, it is not applicable beyond the territorial 
waters (…) That the possibility of jurisdiction beyond the territorial waters was not foreseen in 
1920 does not alter this fact. During negotiations on the Svalbard Treaty, there was full 
awareness of the principle that provisions that restrict sovereignty are to be interpreted 
restrictively and that Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard would be general and fully 
applicable where the Treaty did not include specific restrictions.
54
 
 
Arguably, the wording of the Svalbard Treaty does suggest that the Svalbard Treaty is not 
applicable in areas outside Svalbard’s territorial waters. There is no mention of a continental 
shelf, EEZ, FPZ or other maritime zones in the Svalbard Treaty. Norway can therefore claim 
that it has sovereign rights in the maritime zones. A restrictive literal interpretation of the 
Treaty would support this position.  
Traditional theory includes a principle that the provisions of treaties should be 
interpreted favourably to the state with obligations, because it is presumed that a state would 
not make itself subject to stronger obligations than the Treaty clearly expresses.
55
 In cases of 
doubt, one should therefor choose the alternative that respects the sovereignty of the state. At 
the time of the conclusion of the Svalbard Treaty, this approach to interpretation was 
particularly prevalent.
56
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3.2.3 Object and Purpose 
However, according to VCLT treaties should also be interpreted in ‘in the light of its object 
and purpose’. In contrast to the text, the object and purpose of the Svalbard Treaty suggest 
that the Treaty applies to the maritime zones. As shown, the purpose of the Treaty was to give 
sovereignty to one state, ensure peaceful utilisation and preserve certain economic rights that 
the Treaty parties enjoyed under the previous regime. Anderson has put forward the argument 
that ‘[t]he wording of Article 1 reads like a carefully constructed diplomatic formula, 
constituting a “package deal”.’57 He refers to the ‘equitable regime’ stipulated in the Svalbard 
Treaty’s preamble, as well as the object and purpose of the Treaty, to argue that there was an 
intention of balance between the interests of the signatories. Indeed, Norway’s sovereignty is 
recognised in the same sentence that provides that this recognition is subject to the 
stipulations of the Treaty, i.e. the economic rights of the Treaty parties. The rights in the 
maritime zones derive from Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard. By analogy, this indicates 
that the geographical expansion of Norwegian sovereignty must correspond with an expansion 
of other states’ rights. 
 It is an additional argument that when the sea territory of Svalbard was expanded from 
4 to 12 nautical miles,
58 
this corresponded with an expansion of Treaty party rights.
59
 
However, this expansion of rights may not be directly transferable to other maritime zones 
around Svalbard, as the territorial waters are expressly mentioned in the Svalbard Treaty, and 
other zones are not. The latter is therefore not a very strong argument in favour of the 
application of Svalbard Treaty provisions in the maritime zones.  
 However, the fact that the other maritime zones are not explicitly mentioned by the 
Treaty is not enough in itself to establish that the Treaty does not apply to these zones. A 
central argument is that the EEZ, FPZ or continental shelf did not exist as legal constructs at 
the time the Svalbard Treaty was signed and came into force. The area outside the territorial 
sea was ‘open seas’, where the states already had rights. It is of course impossible to say what 
the parties would have done if such zones existed at the time of the drafting of the Treaty. 
However, it is telling that by applying to the territorial sea, the Treaty was encompassing an 
area which was as wide as it could be. There was no reason for the parties to secure their 
rights in the area outside the territorial waters, by including provisions in the Treaty to this 
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effect. This is a strong argument in favour of a common understanding that the Treaty 
provisions apply as far as Norwegian sovereignty and sovereign rights go in relation to 
Svalbard.  
3.2.4 Context 
Article 31 (1) of VCLT further provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in its ‘context’. The 
context of the terms does not provide any strong arguments pro or contra the question of 
geographical application of the Svalbard Treaty. However, VCLT Article 31 (3) stipulates 
that there shall be taken into account, together with the context (…) any ‘subsequent practice’ 
in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation,
60
 as well as any ‘relevant rules of international law’ applicable in the relations 
between the parties.
61
 
The non-discriminatory FPZ regime has existed for nearly 40 years. Such subsequent 
practice pursuant to article 31 (3b), could in itself indicate that the non-discriminatory 
treatment is based on the Svalbard Treaty, confirming an agreement between the parties.
62
 
However, Norway has constantly claimed that an EEZ can be established at any time, 
weakening this argument significantly. 
 Regarding relevant rules of international law, it may be argued that modern law of the 
sea displaces the Svalbard Treaty. Fife and Fleischer contend that UNCLOS and the Svalbard 
Treaty are incompatible, referring to VCLT article 30 and UNCLOS article 311 (2).
63
 Others 
argue that the two regimes can be harmonised.
64
  One element is that such incompatibility 
would also have to apply to the territorial sea. However, this has never been held by Norway. 
Also, the fact that the non-discriminatory FPZ has existed for so long can be proof that 
harmonisation is possible. Therefore, this cannot be a strong argument in favour of the Treaty 
not applying to the maritime zones.   
3.2.5 Supplementary Means of Interpretation 
Article 32 (a) provides for supplementary means of interpretation in case the interpretation 
according to article 31 leaves the meaning ‘ambiguous or obscure’. These include, but are not 
limited to,
65
 the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. As 
shown, the wording and object and purpose of the Svalbard Treaty support different 
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interpretations and therefore leave the meaning ‘ambiguous’ and ‘obscure’, pursuant to article 
32 (a). 
 Circumstances of the conclusion of the Svalbard Treaty do not provide any more 
guidance than the object and purpose. As for preparatory works, Fleischer gives significant 
weight to statements by Laroche, the Chairman of the Spitsbergen Commission. The 
Chairman stated that all exceptions from sovereignty are mentioned in the Treaty and other 
than this, Norwegian sovereignty applies. Fleischer argues that this reflects the main 
understanding of the Parties.
66
 However, it appears problematic to assign much weight to 
preparatory works such as this, in cases where a treaty is open for other countries to join a 
later point. This is because it would give privilege to the interpretation of the original drafters. 
It would therefore be unreasonable for new signatory parties to be bound by the parties’ 
informal understanding at the time of the drafting. The Svalbard Treaty is open for signing by 
any state. Therefore, the preparatory works cannot be ascribed much weight in the 
interpretation of the Treaty.  
 It has been argued by Churchill and Ulfstein
67
 that consequentialist arguments support 
the position that the Svalbard Treaty does apply to the maritime zones. They point out that it 
would constitute an ‘anomaly’ if other states were given more rights on the land territory of 
Svalbard than in the sea around it. The fact that this is an anomaly cannot in itself to 
invalidate a literal interpretation of the Treaty. However, the argument offers some support to 
the view that the Svalbard Treaty applies in the maritime zones. 
3.2.6 Towards a More Dynamic Approach to Treaty Interpretation? 
Certain practice of courts and tribunals has been used as arguments pro and contra the 
interpretation that the Svalbard Treaty applies to the maritime zones. Six cases that may be 
considered close to the Svalbard problem will be discussed in the following. These concern 
situations where the drafters of a treaty or agreement have not taken account of developments 
in the law of the sea that happened after their conclusion. 
In the arbitration case of Guinea-Bissau/Senegal,
68
 the Court found that an earlier 
agreement relating to the territorial sea did not apply to the EEZ, as the latter did not exist at 
the time of the conclusion of the agreement. This could provide some support to the position 
that the Svalbard Treaty does not apply to the maritime zones. However, as pointed out by 
Ulfstein and Churchill, this case is not directly comparable to the question of Svalbard, 
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because states have not generally considered that existing maritime boundaries automatically 
are also EEZ boundaries.
69
 
In addition, in the Guyana/Suriname case,
70
 the states had extended their existing sea 
territories from 3 nm to 12 nm. Surinam claimed that the new line of delimitation should be a 
continuation from the previous limit of their territorial seas. It was claimed that earlier 
instruments and conduct referred to the limits of the territorial sea at any given time. The 
Tribunal rejected this claim, which can imply that older instruments should not automatically 
be extended to include newer legal constructs. However, as we see, the case is very different 
from the situation of Svalbard and therefore has rather limited relevance in the interpretation 
of the Svalbard Treaty. 
 The two last decisions supporting the view that the Svalbard Treaty does not apply to 
the maritime zones, are Petroleum Development vs. Sheik of Abu Dhabi,
71
 as well as 
Petroleum Development vs. Sheik of Qatar.
72
 In these cases, a company had been given 
exclusive rights to oil exploitation in land and sea areas of the respective states. The arbitrator 
found ‘throughout the territory of the Principality’ of Qatar did not include the continental 
shelf. In the case of Abu Dhabi, the arbitrator stated that it would be artificial to read into the 
contract implications of a doctrine that did not exist at the time. This seems to provide some 
support for the argument that newer legal constructs such as the maritime zones, should not be 
regulated by the Svalbard Treaty provisions, as they were established a long time after the 
conclusion of the Treaty.  
However, objections have been put forward by Ulfstein and Chuchill, stating that 
these cases are not directly transferable to the case of Svalbard, as they concerned 
concessions, not treaties.
73
 The Court’s finding that these concessions did not extend to the 
continental shelf was further an obiter dictum not necessary to decide the case.
74
 In addition, 
the parties to the conflict were one private part and one state, not two or more states, as would 
be the case in relation to a treaty.
75
 These cases therefore have limited value as arguments in 
favour of the Svalbard Treaty not applying to the maritime zones. 
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On the other hand, the case of the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
76
 may suggest that 
the Svalbard Treaty applies to the maritime zones. In this case, a declaration of jurisdiction 
was considered to also include the continental shelf because ‘relating to the territorial status of 
Greece’ was considered a ‘generic term’. Its meaning was intended to ‘follow the evolution of 
the law and to correspond with the meaning attached to the expression by the law in force at 
any given time’.77 Ulfstein and Churchill argue that this case is‘perhaps of limited relevance’, 
but ‘offers a parallel to the Svalbard situation.’78 Fleischer, on the other hand, has rejected this 
argument because the point of the case was not how to interpret the meaning of ‘territory’. 
This was only of ’marginal interest’.79 Establishing that the right to a continental shelf is 
‘relating to’ the ‘territorial status’ of the coastal state would not mean that an agreement on 
rights in one area encompassed by a coastal state’s sovereignty also would encompass other 
areas.
80
 These objections illustrate that the judgment provides limited support to the position 
that the Svalbard Treaty applies to the maritime zones.   
Furthermore, in the Oil Platforms case,
81
 the ICJ found that the wording ‘territories’ in 
a treaty between Iran and the USA included the continental shelf and EEZ. However, as 
pointed out by Ulfstein and Churchill,
 82
 this question is very briefly discussed by the Court 
and is not based upon any authoritative sources, which in turn limits the value of this decision 
for the question of the geographical application of the Svalbard Treaty.  
 There does seem to be rather little international court practice that can give guidance 
to whether the Svalbard Treaty applies to the maritime zones or not. There are in fact no cases 
that are directly comparable. However, a few cases have been used by Ulfstein and Churchill 
in an attempt to identify a development towards a more ‘dynamic’ or ‘evolutionary’ approach 
to Treaty interpretation that would also be relevant in relation to the Svalbard issue. Firstly, 
there is the Iron Rhine case,
84
 where the Court stated that: 
 
 (…) it seems that an evolutive interpretation, which would ensure an application of the treaty 
that would be effective in terms of its object and purpose, will be preferred to a strict 
application of the intertemporal rule.  
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In addition, the Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua case
85
 the ICJ expressed the following: 
 
 (…) there are situations in which the parties’ intent upon conclusion of the treaty was, or may 
be presumed to have been, to give the terms used — or some of them — a meaning or content 
capable of evolving, not one ﬁxed once and for all, so as to make allowance for, among other 
things, developments in international law. In such instances it is indeed in order to respect the 
parties’ common intention at the time the treaty was concluded, not to depart from it, that 
account should be taken of the meaning acquired by the terms in question upon each occasion 
on which the treaty is to be applied.
 
 
 
This quoted dictum is held by Ulfstein and Churchill to possibly have a more general 
relevance for the interpretation and application of older treaties, and that ‘[t]his would suggest 
not only that Norway’s right to establish maritime zones beyond the territorial sea has 
increased over time, but so also has the geographical scope of the non-discriminatory rights of 
the other parties under the Treaty.’86 The statements in these two decisions do seem to support 
a more dynamic approach to interpretation of older treaties, supporting the view that the 
Svalbard Treaty also applies to the maritime zones outside the territorial sea of Svalbard. 
3.2.7 Conclusion 
The wording of the Svalbard Treaty clearly does not mention the maritime zones except for 
the territorial waters. In isolation, this strongly suggests that the Treaty does not apply in these 
areas. This interpretation is supported by the preparatory works and the cases of Petroleum 
Development vs. Sheik of Abu Dhabi and Petroleum Development vs. Sheik of Qatar. 
However, not much weight can be attached to this international court practice, as the result 
seems to differ depending on the situation and the specific agreement or treaty. There are also 
reasons not to place considerable emphasis on the preparatory works of the Treaty as it is 
open for signing by any state. 
Moreover, the object and purpose of the Treaty provides a strong argument in favour 
of the opposite conclusion. This interpretation is supported by a dynamic interpretation, the 
fact that the opposite interpretation would result in anomalies, as well as the Aegean Sea and 
Oil Platforms cases. However, it has been established that this selection of court practice 
cannot be given considerable weight. 
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In reaching a conclusion, I will however consider it decisive that international court 
practice seems to support a more dynamic approach to interpretation, together with the weight 
to be ascribed to the object and purpose of the Treaty. My conclusion is therefore that the 
Svalbard Treaty applies to the maritime zones.  
4. Non-discrimination Requirements of the Svalbard 
Treaty  
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 it was concluded that the Treaty applies to the maritime zones around Svalbard. 
In this chapter there will be a discussion on when differential treatment is acceptable in 
relation to the non-discrimination requirement of the Svalbard Treaty. As shown, the only 
maritime zone outside the territorial sea where there is currently economic activity is the FPZ.  
Relevant to this zone are articles 2 and 3 on fishing, nature preservation and equal liberty of 
access and entry. The relevant articles will be interpreted in light of the rules on treaty 
interpretation in customary international law, as expressed in the VCLT. 
4.2 Interpretation of the Treaty 
4.2.1 Grounds of Discrimination 
There are several international conventions providing non-discrimination requirements. 
Firstly, some international law texts have discrimination prohibitions as their sole aim, such as 
the 1996 UN Convention on Racial Discrimination
87
 and the 1979 UN Convention on 
Discrimination Against Women.
88
 Other documents provide a wide spectre of rights, such as 
the UN Declaration on Human Rights
89
  and the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
90
 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds such as gender, race, skin colour, language, religion, 
political views, as well as national or social origin. A prohibition of discrimination based on 
nationality is a more narrow prohibition than those provided by these human rights 
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instruments. In the EU, the prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of nationality
92
 
is meant to realise the goal of free movement of goods, capital, services and people. Similarly, 
the non-discrimination requirement of the Svalbard Treaty is meant to protect certain 
economic rights for the Treaty parties. EU law thus seems the most similar to the regime of 
the Svalbard Treaty. It is worth mentioning that article 4 of the EEA agreement also provides 
a prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality.
93
Although Norway is a party to this 
agreement, it does not apply to Svalbard.
94
 
The Svalbard Treaty does not contain a legal definition of discrimination or unequal 
treatment. However, its individual provisions deal with differential treatment in specific areas. 
Several articles, including articles 2 and 3, prohibit differential treatment of ‘ships’ or 
‘nationals’ of the ‘High Contracting Parties’. This wording indicates that discrimination based 
on nationality is at the core of the prohibition. However, the provisions also contain wordings 
that seem to include general prohibitions against differential treatment. As an example of this, 
article 3 (1) provides for the Treaty Parties’ nationals ‘equal liberty of access and entry’ for 
‘any reason or object whatever’ to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories, and that ‘they 
may carry on there without impediment’ specific activities ‘on a footing of absolute equality. 
The prohibition against discrimination is here articulated in a general manner, and does not 
seem to limit the prohibition to discrimination based on nationality.  
However, the object and purpose of the Svalbard Treaty may shed light on the 
meaning of these provisions. The main purposes of the Svalbard Treaty are expressed in its 
preamble, as well as in the individual articles of the Treaty. The preamble states ‘Desirous, 
while recognising the sovereignty of Norway (…), of seeing these territories provided with an 
equitable regime, in order to assure their development and peaceful utilisation’. This wording 
expresses a wish to assign sovereignty over the archipelago to one single state, to provide 
order and peaceful utilisation, as well as retaining certain terra nullius rights for the States 
parties. The goal of retaining economic rights is the most central in respect of the non-
discrimination requirement. Fulfilling this purpose requires that nationals from the state 
parties are treated no better or worse than nationals from other States parties. In other words, 
discrimination based on nationality appears to be the clear focus of the prohibition. 
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Prohibition of differential treatment on other grounds is not explicitly mentioned in the 
Treaty, nor does it follow from an interpretation in light of its object and purpose or context. 
Therefore it can be concluded that the prohibition is against discrimination based on 
nationality and does not exclude differential treatment based on other criteria. It must be 
added that this does not mean that differential treatment on any other grounds can be accepted 
as non-discriminatory. Section 4.2.3 will focus on whether objective goals can justify 
differential treatment of different nationalities. Before this, however, section 4.2.2 will discuss 
if the prohibition is primarily aimed at direct or indirect discrimination.   
4.2.2 Direct or Indirect Discrimination 
Direct discrimination is often easier to identify than indirect discrimination. Direct 
discrimination would typically be differential treatment explicitly stated in laws or 
regulations, so-called formally differential treatment. Indirect discrimination, on the other 
hand, can be a situation where a formal measure treats nationals of all states alike, but in 
effect puts nationals of one or more specific states at a particular disadvantage.  
The question of indirect discrimination has been discussed in relation to other 
international non-discrimination requirements. As the EU regime is the most similar to the 
Svalbard Treaty regime, relevant cases for comparison include Italy vs. Commission, where 
the ECJ stated that: ‘Discrimination in substance would consist in treating either similar 
situation differently or different situations identically.’95 In that particular case, formally 
differential treatment was not considered discrimination based on nationality,
96
 as there was 
no discrimination in substance. Also, in Anklagemyndigheden v Jack Noble Kerr,
97
 and 
Albert Romkes v. Officier van Justitie for the District of Zwolle,
98
 the ECJ accepted that 
allocating quotas on the basis of traditional fishing was objective criteria meant to protect 
existing commerce, which was not in violation of the prohibition against discriminating on the 
grounds of nationality.
99
 In other words, formally differential treatment was accepted non-
discriminatory, as the Court found that there was no discrimination in effect.  
 The question is thus whether the prohibition of discrimination in the Svalbard Treaty 
includes direct or indirect discrimination. Firstly, article 2 (1) of the Svalbard Treaty provides 
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that ships and nationals from all High Contracting parties shall ‘enjoy equally the rights’ of 
fishing. This wording is general and does not indicate whether the prohibition is against direct 
discrimination or discrimination in effect. Similarly, a general wording is chosen in article 3 
(1), which can point to both formal discrimination and discrimination in effect, by providing 
‘equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever’ and ‘carry on there 
without impediment’ all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a ‘footing 
of absolute equality’. The wording can indicate both formal discrimination and discrimination 
in effect. 
The same applies to the first part of article 2 (2) of the Svalbard Treaty, which 
stipulates that measures to ensure nature preservation shall always be ‘applicable equally’ to 
the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties. However, article 2 (2) adds ‘without any 
exemption, privilege or favour’ ‘direct or indirect’ to the ‘advantage of any one of them’. As 
indirect differential effects are expressly mentioned in the provision, this indicates a focus on 
the actual effects of a measure, not just formal equality.  
Furthermore, an emphasis on discriminatory effects is supported by the object and 
purpose of the Svalbard Treaty, which included retaining certain terra nullius rights for the 
Treaty parties. Fulfilling this purpose cannot be ensured simply by formal non-discrimination, 
as indirect discrimination is likely to be just as detrimental to the purpose of maintaining 
certain terra nullius rights for the parties. In light of the object and purpose of the Treaty, there 
is no reason to believe that the Treaty parties would intend to establish a hollow prohibition, 
i.e. a prohibition that did not take into consideration the latent danger of indirect 
discrimination. 
Moreover, formal differential treatment can hinder indirect discrimination in some 
cases. If a certain nationality is expected to suffer greater negative effects from a measure, 
adjustments can be made by formal differential treatment to ensure that this does not happen. 
Such an approach is more likely to protect the object and purpose of the Svalbard Treaty. 
After this, it is natural to conclude that the focus of the prohibition is meant to be on 
discriminatory effects, rather than formal identical treatment in itself. 
Ulfstein argues that the Treaty’s focus on effects establishes a requirement of formally 
differential treatment in law, if this is ‘needed in order to facilitate non-discrimination in 
fact’.103 Since the prohibition of the Svalbard Treaty is aimed at effects of a measure rather 
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than identical treatment in itself, it could indeed be argued that the prohibition may also 
require differential formal treatment in order to prevent discrimination in substance. 
 
4.2.3 Objective Justification  
It has already been established that the core of the prohibition is discrimination based on 
nationality. This chapter will discuss whether having an objective purpose can justify 
implementing measures that have differential effects for nationalities of the Treaty parties, in 
activities regulated by the Svalbard Treaty. A measure with a legitimate purpose may in 
practice cause differential effects for different nationalities. A relevant example is the 
introduction of new mesh size standards. The aim of such a measure could be legitimate and 
based on objective criteria, but still end up affecting nationals from one of the States in 
particular, due to having different standards and gear. The question is thus whether this 
automatically constitutes a violation of the non-discrimination requirement.  
 There is no explicit mention of the purpose of a measure in the Svalbard Treaty 
provisions. Article 2 (2) does mention that Norway is free to introduce measures for nature 
preservation, but that such measures ‘shall always be applicable equally to the nationals of all 
the High Contracting Parties without any exemption, privilege or favour whatsoever, direct or 
indirect to the advantage of any of them’. The provision indicates a focus on nature 
preservation, but also stipulates that measures to ensure this should not be discriminatory. The 
wording gives little guidance in how to balance these two objectives. 
The object and purpose of the Treaty illustrate a tension between the different goals of 
the Svalbard Treaty. One of the goals of the Treaty was to recognise the sovereignty of one 
State, which in turn would establish law and order on the archipelago. Therefore, a strong 
argument is that automatically recognising all types of differential treatment as violations may 
have negative consequences for effective administration of the archipelago. As an example of 
this, Ulfstein
105
 mentions advanced safety regulations. Due to different technological levels in 
companies from some States, such regulations could prove more costly for them than others.  
Unconditionally establishing violations in such cases would make it very difficult for Norway 
to make laws and regulations with legitimate aims, such as improving the work environment 
or secure nature preservation. Therefore, allowing for a certain room to undertake measures 
with an objective goal may be necessary for effective administration.  
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However, another goal of the Svalbard Treaty was to preserve certain economic rights, 
with a focus on non-discrimination of the nationalities. Considering the strong emphasis on 
effects in the Svalbard Treaty, differential treatment cannot automatically be accepted, as long 
as the measure is based on objective criteria. Such an approach could lead to abuse where a 
discriminatory measure is introduced under the pretence of an objective goal. The major 
challenge therefore is drawing the line between effective administration and discriminatory 
effects, as both reflect the object and purpose of the Treaty. The wording gives little guidance 
as to how to review such value judgments, and the context provides in addition to the object 
and purpose.  
In order to find a balance between these objectives, Ulfstein
106
 suggests applying a test 
of proportionality. In his suggestion, the aim must be legitimate and the measure must be 
achieved with a minimum of disadvantageous effects. Proportionality tests are well known 
from international law, where they occur in different forms and contexts. In maritime 
boundary delimitation, a disproportionality test has been applied.
107
 Furthermore, 
proportionality has been used in the field of self-defence of states, with a focus on necessity 
and proportionality.
108
 Moreover, proportionality is an important element in assessing human 
rights violations. Articles 8 (2), 9 (2), 10 (2) and 11 (2) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), prescribe that a measure must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has interpreted this as the measure must be 
proportional to the goal it is meant to reach, and it must have the least negative consequences 
for the individual.
109
 Most similar to the Svalbard Treaty regime is EU law, where 
proportionality has been recognised by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as 
a general principle of law, as illustrated by the following quote from the British American 
Tobacco Case:
 110
 
 
As a preliminary point, it ought to be borne in mind that the principle of proportionality, 
which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that measures implemented 
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through Community provisions should be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and 
must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (…)
 111
 
By mentioning appropriateness and necessity, the Court refers to the proportionality test 
commonly applied in EU law. There is no strict formula for the proportionality test. However, 
it can be articulated as a four step procedure. The first step is looking at whether there is a 
legitimate aim and secondly whether the measure is suitable to reach this aim. Furthermore, 
the measure must be necessary to reach the goal, which is often reviewed under a least 
restrictive measure test. The final step is proportionality stricto sensu, a balancing of the 
importance of the aim against the negative effects of the measure.  
Furthermore, in both EU law and international human rights law,
112
 proportionality is 
closely linked to a margin of appreciation. The intensity of the control of measures made by 
national authorities varies from area to area. In the mentioned British American Tobacco case, 
the Court indicated that the margin of appreciation must be considerable in cases relating to 
political, economic and social choices, where complex assessments are required:  
 
(…) the Community legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in an area such as that 
involved in the present case, which entails political, economic and social choices on its part, 
and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Consequently, the legality of 
a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly 
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to 
pursue (…) 113 
It could be argued that there is room for using a proportionality test within the widely 
articulated provisions of the Svalbard Treaty. However, little guidance is given as to what 
content such an approach could have. If a proportionality test were to be applied in a case 
concerning the Svalbard Treaty, this would require the balancing of the signatories’ rights on 
one side and the needs of the government on the other. In other words, the aim of the measure 
would have to be weighed against the discriminatory effects on the different nationalities. 
 Also, the application of a proportionality test would raise the question of how much 
space for manoeuvre Norway, as the sovereign state, has in evaluating what is a proportionate 
measure to reach a specific goal. There is no doubt that the question of the non-discrimination 
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requirement of the Treaty entails political and economic choices on Norway’s part, and that it 
involves complex assessments. If such a proportionality analysis were to have similarities to 
the test applied within the EU, it is not unlikely that Norway would be allowed broad 
discretion in this area. This topic will be discussed further under section 5.2.3 on the ‘Kiel’ 
Case of 2014, where the Norwegian Supreme Court for the first time introduced a 
proportionality analysis in relation to the non-discrimination requirement of the Svalbard 
Treaty. 
4.3 Findings 
It has been established that the prohibition against discrimination in articles 2 and 3 has two 
elements, namely discriminatory purpose based on nationality and discriminatory effects.
114
  
An obvious violation of the Treaty would be a situation where a measure is taken with the 
purpose to discriminate on the basis of nationality, and it also has differential effects for the 
nationalities. However, all differential effects cannot be considered violations of the Treaty, as 
this would create great difficulties in managing the archipelago, including the maritime areas 
beyond the territorial sea. Therefore, differential treatment must be understood as a 
prerequisite for establishing discrimination, but cannot in itself be sufficient to do so. 
Discrimination based on other objective criteria than nationality is not prohibited by the 
Svalbard Treaty provisions. However, when adopting measures based on objective goals, 
these may have differential effects for the different nationals. In order to avoid abuse and 
ensure a minimum of disadvantageous effects, a solution may be found in the proportionality 
tests applied in international human rights law and EU law. Hereunder, a pertinent question is 
what margin of appreciation will be granted Norway. 
5. Decisions by the Norwegian Supreme Court 
5.1 Introduction 
To this date, no international court has taken a position on the geographical or material scope 
of the Svalbard Treaty. However, fishermen and ship owning companies from the EU, Spain 
and Iceland have appealed three criminal cases to the Norwegian Supreme Court, claiming 
that Norway has violated the Svalbard Treaty. These appellants were private parties, not 
states. It is, however, of interest to analyse the way in which the Norwegian judiciary has 
                                                          
114
 See also Ulfstein 1995, op. cit., p. 232. 
30 
 
handled the cases, notably how the Svalbard Treaty has been interpreted and applied at the 
domestic level. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, Norwegian court practice as it 
relates to the maritime waters adjacent to Svalbard is of particular interest since Norway is the 
coastal State and thus most significantly affected by the Svalbard Treaty regime.   
The Supreme Court found that in order to establish a violation of the Treaty, two 
questions have had to be answered affirmatively. Firstly, there would have to be a case of 
discrimination based on nationality. Secondly, the Svalbard Treaty had to be applied in the 
area where the alleged violations took place.  
5.2 A Reluctance to Discuss the Spatial Scope of the Svalbard 
Treaty? 
In all the three mentioned cases the Supreme Court deemed it unnecessary to discuss the 
Treaty’s area of application, since the Court did not find any cases of discrimination based on 
nationality. Ordinarily, the procedure would be to firstly establish if the treaty applied, 
secondly to consider if there was a violation of the treaty. There is no reason to discuss 
alleged violations of a treaty that does not apply. The Supreme Court’s approach in these 
cases is thus interesting in itself.  
The district
115 
and appeal courts
116 
chose the opposite approach of the Supreme Court 
in the so-called ‘Kiel’ case. Both lower Courts found that the Treaty did not apply to the 
maritime zones. Therefore the topic of discrimination was not discussed in detail. If the 
Supreme Court had done the same, this may have had more wide-ranging consequences. 
Notably, a decision that the Treaty did not apply to the maritime zones could provoke 
reactions from other signatory States. However, if the conclusion was that the Treaty did 
indeed apply, this would be against the official view of Norway. Although surprising at first, 
the Supreme Court’s approach seems like a ‘diplomatic’ alternative to solve the cases that 
have been brought before it, without having to discuss the controversial issue relating to the 
geographical scope of the Treaty. 
 In the cases that will be analysed in the following, the Supreme Court did not apply 
the Svalbard Treaty directly, as it never took a stance on the Treaty’s geographical scope of 
application. However, the Court interpreted relevant Treaty provisions on order to establish 
whether or not there had been cases of discrimination. In the following, I will therefore 
identify what the Supreme Court has considered to be non-discriminatory treatment. 
                                                          
115
 TNHER-2012-141874, Nord-Troms tingrett, decision of 10 December 2012. 
116
 LH-2013-50194, Hålogaland lagmannsrett, decision of 11 July 2013. 
31 
 
5.2 Non-Discrimination in the FPZ 
5.2.1 Bjørgulfur and Ottar Birting  
Two ship owning companies and the captains of two Icelandic trawlers, Bjørgulfur and Ottar 
Birthing, were convicted for illegal cod fishing in the FPZ outside Svalbard.
117
 Iceland is a 
party to the Svalbard Treaty, but does not have a historical track record of fishing cod in the 
area. In accordance with the Norwegian regulations
118
 Iceland therefore had not been 
allocated cod quotas in the FPZ. The appellants claimed before the Supreme Court that the 
regulations were in violation of the non-discrimination requirement of the Svalbard Treaty. 
This was the first case of its sort to make it to the Norwegian Supreme Court. 
First, the Supreme Court found that the prohibition against discrimination was aimed 
at differential treatment based on nationality. The Court underlined that there was no 
prohibition on rationing based on objective selection criteria.
119
 Further, the Court seemed to 
focus on indirect discrimination than formal discrimination in its reasoning, as it pointed out 
that the regulations gave guarantees to continue fishing for to those who have traditionally 
been conducting such activity in the area, while others were just denied from starting. The 
Court supported its findings by referring the fact that objective criteria in general have been 
accepted as justifying differential treatment in international law prohibiting discrimination 
based on nationality, including EU law.
120
 It was also added that third country quotas based 
on historical track records have been accepted in the literature on the FPZ, also by scholars 
who are usually critical of Norway’s official position on the maritime zones around Svalbard, 
such as Ulfstein.  
As for the appellants’ claim that no signatory States could be denied fishing rights, the 
Court dismissed this as an impracticable rule, referring to the fact that the Treaty is open for 
signing by all countries, and is currently ratified by over 40 states. The result would be that 
quota sizes in practice would exclude third country fishing.
121
 Thereby, it seems the Court 
rejected the existence of any substantive rights for the Treaty parties to fishing in the FPZ. 
At first glance, States with traditional fishing rights may seem to have enjoyed more 
favourable treatment than other signatory States. However, the Court seemed to put emphasis 
on preventing indirect discrimination in this case. The Court found that the purpose and effect 
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of the regulations was to protect existing commerce, not to treat anyone differently because of 
their nationality.
122
 In other words, there was a legitimate aim and the measure was suitable to 
reach this aim. The Court therefore concluded that the regulations were not in violation of the 
non-discrimination requirement of the Svalbard Treaty. The Court did not explicitly discuss if 
the negative effects on some nationalities were severe enough to constitute a violation of the 
Treaty. However, by pointing out that only some nationals are dependent on fishing in this 
area, this could imply that those who are denied starting would not be significantly affected.  
5.2.2 Olazar and Olaberri  
During inspections of the Spanish twin trawlers Olazar and Olaberri, a big discrepancy 
between the catch diary and the actual catch was discovered.
123
 The captains were thus fined 
for failing to reporting their catches. One of them was also fined for wrongful reporting, while 
the ship owning company’s fishing licences were withdrawn. The appellants claimed that 
Russians were treated more favourably than other signatory States, and that Norway had 
failed to introduce general measures against Russians who systematically commit the same 
violations as them. They maintained that this was a violation of Norway’s Treaty obligations. 
 Again, the Supreme Court established that the prohibition on discrimination is directed 
at discrimination based on nationality and that the Treaty does not prohibit discrimination 
based on objective criteria other than nationality.
124
 The Court found that there was no formal 
discrimination as the reporting rules applied to everyone. Moreover, the Court did not find 
that there were any significant differences in the enforcement of regulations between vessels 
from the different nations.
125
 All were given warnings by the Coast Guard if reporting 
regulations were not respected, including Russians.  
The interesting part is that the Supreme Court acknowledged that Russian vessels did 
not send active/passive reports or weekly reports. However, it was maintained that there was 
an important difference in the need for control,
126
 as a result of the Norwegian-Russian 
Fisheries cooperation in the area. The Russian Authorities were controlling and reporting on 
their catch to the Norwegian Authorities every month. Norway was responsible for controlling 
the catch by Norwegian vessels, as well as vessels fishing on the third party quota in the FPZ. 
Therefore, the need for control was considered more necessary for these vessels.
127
 The Court 
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added that lack of compliance is discussed through diplomatic channels and in the fishery 
negotiations with Russia. The Court thus found that in spite of repeated violations by Russian 
vessels, no general measures were considered necessary. The Court did not discuss 
discrimination in other respects, as this was considered unrelated to the appellants’ case.   
This decision has been criticised by Ulfstein and Churchill, who described the Court’s 
arguments as ‘not entirely convincing’.128 This is because diplomatic efforts to convince 
Russia to follow the reporting requirements indeed suggest that there is a perceived need for 
them to do so. Ulfstein and Churchill also argue that it is reasonable to require for Norway to 
enforce its own regulations, which apply equally to all, even if there is less need to do so in 
relation to Russia.  
It is also worth noting that the reasoning by the Supreme Court could give an 
impression that there is created a special status for Russians due to bilateral agreements. Other 
signatory States could ask what would happen if vessels from their country ignored the 
regulations in the same systematic way. As discussed in chapter 4, due the Treaty’s focus on 
differential effects, there might be a requirement for Norway to introduce formally different 
measures in order to avoid discrimination in substance. 
5.2.3 The ‘Kiel’ Case  
In the Kiel case,
129
 an Icelandic captain and a German ship owning company, Deutsche 
Fischfang Union GmbH, were found guilty of having violated the Norwegian fishing 
regulations in the FPZ, by exceeding the 19 percent limit of maximum retainable by-catch of 
haddock.
130
 While Norway and Russia were fishing haddock on their shares of the Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC), Greenland had been allocated a third country quota, while the EU 
and Faroe Islands had to follow by-catch limitations. The appellants maintained that the 
regulations were in violation of the non-discrimination requirement of the Svalbard Treaty.   
First, and in conformity with its previous practice, the Supreme Court concluded that 
protecting existing commerce was a legitimate aim, and that historical track records 
constituted objective selection criteria. Historically, EU vessels had only been fishing 
haddock as by-catch in the direct fishing for other species, and the by-catch limitations were 
based on these historical fishing patterns. It was added that managing the fish stock was in 
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accordance with obligations stemming from UNCLOS, such as article 61 on conservation of 
the living resources. 
What sets this case apart from the previous two cases is that although the Supreme 
Court had identified the aim of the regulations as legitimate and considered the measure 
suitable to reach this aim, it was recognised that the regulations produced negative economic 
effects for EU vessels. More specifically, the Court found that if the EU had been given 
quotas the same size as the limit for maximum retainable by-catch of haddock, they would 
have equal conditions to vessels from Norway, Russia and Greenland. Thus the Court found 
that the Authorities could have chosen a measure with less negative impact for the EU 
vessels. Based on these statements it seems that the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
formally different treatment also resulted in differential effects.  
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court introduced a new element in the analysis of the non-
discrimination requirement, as it stated that the non-discrimination requirement had to be 
weighed against Norway’s sovereignty as stipulated in article 1, as well as the need for room 
to conduct responsible management of the natural resources. The Court referred to article 2 
(2) which provided that Norway was free to maintain, take or decree suitable measures to 
conserve the flora and fauna, finding support for a substantial margin of appreciation for 
Norway.
131
 Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that a measure causing differential effects for 
the Treaty parties and their vessels would only constitute a violation, if its purpose was 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty, or was disproportional: 
 
 Et tiltak som i virkning medfører at traktatpartene og deres fartøyer behandles ulikt, vil derfor 
bare kunne utgjøre traktatstridig diskriminering dersom tiltaket fremmer interesser som er 
uforenlige med Svalbardtraktatens gjenstand og formål, eller er uforholdsmessig.
 132
   
This interpretation was reiterated by the Court later, when it stated that Norway’s sovereignty 
and governance responsibilities over Svalbard gave the Norwegian Fisheries Authorities 
significant freedom in the choice of regulations. This included where the regulations resulted 
in different nationalities being treated differently, as long as the measure safeguarded 
objective and legitimate purposes and was proportional: 
(…) Norges suverenitet og forvaltningsansvaret over Svalbard gir norske fiskerimyndigheter 
en betydelig frihet ved valg av reguleringsform. Dette gjelder også der reguleringen i resultat 
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leder til at ulike nasjoner forskjellsbehandles, så fremt tiltaket ivaretar objektive og legitime 
formål og er forholdsmessig.
133
 
In spite of having identified an alternative measure with less negative consequences for EU 
vessels, the Supreme Court concluded that there had been no case of discrimination. The 
decisive element was that the by-catch regulations, in contrast to a quota system, could be 
adopted quickly and unilaterally. Allocating quotas would have required discussions with 
Russia, due to the Norwegian-Russian fisheries cooperation. In contrast, by-catch regulations 
could be set by Norway alone. There had been no regulations for EU vessels previously to 
2011. The Court remarked that the regulations did not seem to necessarily be meant as a 
permanent solution, but as a quick response to a situation that had to be dealt with, namely the 
lack of regulations and need to manage the fisheries. Differential treatment could therefore be 
justified.  
It is worth mentioning that the Court did express that it was in doubt. Its reasoning 
seems to imply that the argument of efficiency could weaken over time. At some point, 
Norway has had enough time to go through the process of allocating quotas to the EU. 
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that giving the EU by-catch limits for haddock will not 
be considered a legitimate alternative to quotas in the long run.
134
  
Although proportionality analyses are well-known in international law, it is interesting 
that the Supreme Court was of the opinion that such an approach could also be used in 
relation to the Svalbard Treaty. It is especially worth noting that the Supreme Court concluded 
that Norway’s margin of appreciation was substantial.135 In others words, the Court found that 
Norway has significant room to decide whether or not a measure is necessary and 
proportional. Together, this indicates large freedom for Norway to undertake measures, as 
long as they are based on objective grounds, have a legitimate purpose, and are proportional. 
Proportionality is not established as a general principle of international law, although 
it is found in various formats in different contexts, as shown in chapter 4. In relation to 
economic rights, such a proportionality analysis is often used within the EU. An objection 
could be that not all Treaty parties are members of the EU, possibly making this this approach 
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less transferable to the Svalbard situation. However, as shown, different forms of 
proportionality is not unknown in international instruments involving more regions than 
Europe, i.e. at the global scale.  
As discussed previously, there could be room within the Svalbard Treaty provisions to 
include a test of proportionality, although it cannot be directly deduced from the wording of 
the provisions. There are good reasons to apply a test of proportionality in cases where there 
is an objective goal, but discriminatory effects, as both effective administration and non-
discrimination reflects the object and purpose of the Svalbard Treaty. The Treaty itself does 
not provide much guidance as to how these provisions can be applied in practice. Interpreting 
the provisions to include a test of proportionality in such cases therefore seems like a 
reasonable approach. It remains to be seen, however, whether an international court will apply 
the same approach as the Norwegian Supreme Court and whether a large margin of 
appreciation will be granted Norway.  
 
5.5 Findings 
One significant finding is that the Supreme Court did not find that quota allocation based on 
traditional fishing patterns was in violation of the Treaty. At first sight, this form of 
differential treatment can seem as discrimination based on nationality. However, such criteria 
have been accepted as objective considerations in international law. The Court found that 
there was an objective purpose and no discrimination in substance. This approach is in line 
with the conclusions of chapter 4 that formal discrimination can be needed in order to avoid 
discrimination in effect. 
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court found an objective purpose and no discriminatory 
effects in the 2006 case. As for not introducing general measures to ensure that Russians 
comply with the Norwegian reporting regulations in the FPZ, this might give other States 
parties an impression that Russia has been given a special favourable status in the zone. It 
might also be problematic considering a possible requirement for Norway to introduce formal 
differential treatment in order to avoid discrimination in substance.  
 In the most recent judgment, the Supreme Court provided a much more thorough 
analysis of the non-discrimination requirement than it had done in its previous decisions. One 
reason for this may be the difference in the underlying facts of the respective cases. In the 
‘Kiel’ case, the formally different treatment led to differential effects for the nationalities. 
This differs from the 1996 decision, where formally different treatment was justified because 
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it prevented discrimination in substance. In the case from 2006, the Court did not find any 
differential effects for the nationalities. While this might in part explain the more refined 
approach of the Court in its most recent decision, we also see traces of international, or at 
least European, influences in the approach of the Supreme Court.  
6. Final Conclusions 
In this thesis I have concluded that the Svalbard Treaty does apply to the maritime zones 
beyond Svalbard’s territorial waters. As demonstrated, however, there are also good 
arguments supporting the opposite conclusion. Possibly due to this complex situation, the 
Norwegian Supreme Court has never discussed the geographical scope of the Svalbard Treaty. 
The Supreme Court has so far only discussed the content of the non-discrimination 
requirement set out in the Treaty’s provisions.  
The Supreme Court has established that the prohibition is against discrimination on 
the grounds of nationality, and that differential treatment can be allowed if it is based on 
objective criteria. Formally differential treatment has been accepted in cases where there were 
no discriminatory effects. In its most recent decision, the Court performed a proportionality 
analysis in order to balance the negative effects of the measure on some nationalities against 
the sovereignty of Norway as a coastal State, including Norway’s need for efficient 
administration. It is also interesting to note that the Court maintained that Norway has a 
substantial margin of appreciation in choosing regulations for nature conservation. 
It remains to be seen, however, if and how a competent international court will 
conclude on the question of the geographical and material scope of the Treaty, including if it 
will follow the wide margin of appreciation proposed by the Norwegian Supreme Court. Also, 
the scope of this thesis does not extend to a consideration of what implications the decisions 
by the Norwegian judiciary shall have res interpretata, that is, if domestic court practice has 
value as a means of interpretation in light of the rules on treaty interpretation in international 
law. While the time constraints in the present study did not allow for such analysis, this is 
indeed a question that deserves further study. 
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8. Appendix 
 
Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland 
and the British overseas Dominions and Sweden concerning 
Spitsbergen signed in Paris 9th February 1920. 
 
The President of the United States of America; His Majesty the King of Great Britain and 
Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the 
King of Denmark; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of Italy; His 
Majesty the Emperor of Japan; His Majesty the King of Norway; Her Majesty the Queen of 
the Netherlands; His Majesty the King of Sweden, 
Desirous, while recognising the sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, 
including Bear Island, of seeing these territories provided with an equitable regime, in order 
to assure their development and peaceful utilisation,  
Have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries with a view to concluding a Treaty to this 
effect:  
[Names of plenipotentiaries not reproduced here.]  
Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as 
follows: 
Article 1 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to recognize, subject to the stipulations of the present 
Treaty, the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, 
comprising, with Bear Island of Beeren-Eiland, all the islands situated between 10° and 35° 
longitude East of Greenwich and between 74° and 81° latitude North, especially West 
Spitsbergen, North-East Land, Barents Island, Edge Island, Wiche Islands, Hope Island or 
Hopen-Eiland, and Prince Charles Forland, together with all islands great or small and rocks 
appertaining thereto. (See annexed map) 
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Article 2 
Ships and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing 
and hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters. 
Norway shall be free to maintain, take or decree suitable measures to ensure the preservation 
and, if necessary, the re-constitution of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their 
territorial waters; it being clearly understood that these measures shall always be applicable 
equally to the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties without any exemption, privilege 
or favour whatsoever, direct or indirect to the advantage of any one of them. 
Occupiers of land whose rights have been recognized in accordance with the terms of Articles 
6 and 7 will enjoy the exclusive right of hunting on their own land: 1) in the neighbourhood of 
their habitations, houses, stores, factories and installations, constructed for the purpose of 
developing their property, under conditions laid down by the local police regulations: 2) 
within a radius of 10 kilometres round the headquarters of their place of business or works; 
and in both cases, subject always to the observance of regulations made by the Norwegian 
Government in accordance with the conditions laid down in the present Article. 
Article 3 
The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and entry 
for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in 
Article 1; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on there 
without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing 
of absolute equality. 
They shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality to the exercise and practice of 
all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial enterprises both on land and in the territorial 
waters, and no monopoly shall be established on any account or for any enterprise whatever. 
Notwithstanding any rules relating to coasting trade which may be in force in Norway, ships 
of the High Contracting Parties going to or coming from the territories specified in Article 1 
shall have the right to put into Norwegian ports on their outward or homeward voyage for the 
purpose of taking on board or disembarking passengers or cargo going to or coming from the 
said territories, or for any other purpose. 
It is agreed that in every respect and especially with regard to exports, imports and transit 
traffic, the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties, their ships and goods shall not be 
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subject to any charges or restrictions whatever which are not borne by the nationals, ships or 
goods which enjoy in Norway the treatment of the most favoured nation; Norwegian 
nationals, ships or goods being for this purpose assimilated to those of the other High 
Contracting Parties, and not treated more favourably in any respect. 
No charge or restriction shall be imposed on the exportation of any goods to the territories of 
any of the Contracting Powers other or more onerous than on the exportation of similar goods 
to the territory of any other Contracting Power (including Norway) or to any other destination. 
Article 4 
All public wireless telegraphy stations established or to be established by, or with the 
authorization of, the Norwegian Government within the territories referred to in Article 1 
shall always be open on a footing of absolute equality to communications from ships of all 
flags and from nationals of the High Contracting Parties, under the conditions laid down in 
the Wireless Telegraphy Convention of July 5, 1912, or in the subsequent International 
Convention which may be concluded to replace it. 
Subject to international obligations arising out of a state of war, owners of landed property 
shall always be at liberty to establish and use for their own purposes wireless telegraphy 
installations, which shall be free to communicate on private business with fixed or moving 
wireless stations, including those on board ships and aircraft. 
Article 5 
The High Contracting Parties recognize the utility of establishing an international 
meteorological station in the territories specifies in Article 1, the organization of which shall 
form the subject of a subsequent Convention. 
Conventions shall also be concluded laying down the conditions under which scientific 
investigations may be conducted in the said territories. 
Article 6 
Subject to the provisions of the present Article, acquired rights of nationals of the High 
Contracting Parties shall be recognized. 
Claims arising from taking possession or from occupation of land before the signature of the 
present Treaty shall be dealt with in accordance with the Annex hereto, which will have the 
same force and effect as the present Treaty. 
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Article 7 
With regard to methods of acquisition, enjoyment and exercise of the right of ownership of 
property, including mineral rights, in the territories specified in Article 1, Norway undertakes 
to grant to all nationals of the High Contracting Parties treatment based on complete equality 
and in conformity with the stipulations of the present Treaty. 
Expropriation may be resorted to only on grounds of public utility and on payment of proper 
compensation. 
Article 8 
Norway undertakes to provide for the territories specified in Article 1 mining regulations 
which, especially from the point of view of imposts, taxes or charges of any kind, and of 
general or particular labour conditions, shall exclude all privileges, monopolies or favours for 
the benefit of the State or of the nationals of any one of the High Contracting Parties, 
including Norway, and shall guarantee to the paid staff of all categories the remuneration and 
protection necessary for their physical, moral and intellectual welfare. 
Taxes, dues and duties levied shall be devoted exclusively to the said territories and shall not 
exceed what is required for the object in view. 
So far, particularly, as exportation of minerals is concerned, the Norwegian Government shall 
have right to levy an export duty which shall not exceed 1 per cent of the maximum value of 
the minerals exported up to 100 000 tons, and beyond that quantity the duty will be 
proportionately diminished. The value shall be fixed at the end of the navigation season by 
calculating the average free on board price obtained. 
Three months before the date fixed for their coming into force, the draft mining regulations 
shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the other Contracting Powers. If 
during this period one or more of the said Powers propose to modify these regulations before 
they are applied, such proposals shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the 
other Contracting Powers in order that they may be submitted to examination and the decision 
of a Commission composed of one representative of each of the said Powers. This 
Commission shall meet at the invitation of the Norwegian Government and shall come to a 
decision within a period of three months from the date of its first meeting. Its decisions shall 
be taken by a majority. 
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Article 9 
Subject to the rights and duties resulting from the admission of Norway to the League of 
Nations, Norway undertakes not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base in 
the territories specified in Article 1 and not to construct any fortification in the said territories, 
which may never be used for warlike purposes. 
Article 10 
Until the recognition by the High Contracting Parties of a Russian Government shall permit 
Russia to adhere to the present Treaty, Russian nationals and companies shall enjoy the same 
rights as nationals of the High Contracting Parties. 
Claims in the territories specified in Article 1 which they may have to put forward shall be 
presented under the conditions laid down in the present Treaty (Article 6 and Annex) through 
the intermediary of the Danish Government, who declare their willingness to lend their good 
offices for this purpose. 
The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified. 
Ratifications shall be deposited at Paris as soon as possible. 
Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe may confine their action to 
informing the Government of the French Republic, through their diplomatic representative at 
Paris, that their ratification has been given, and in this case, they shall transmit the instrument 
as soon as possible. 
The present Treaty will come into force, in so far as the stipulations of Article 8 are 
concerned, from the date of its ratification by all the signatory Powers; and in all other 
respects on the same date as the mining regulations provided for in that Article. 
Third Powers will be invited by the Government of the French Republic to adhere to the 
present Treaty duly ratified. This adhesion shall be effected by a communication addressed to 
the French Government, which will undertake to notify the other Contracting Parties. 
In witness whereof the abovenamed Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty. 
Done at Paris, the ninth day of February, 1920, in duplicate, one copy to be transmitted to the 
Government of His Majesty the King of Norway, and one deposited in the archives of the 
French Republic; authenticated copies will be transmitted to the other Signatory Powers. 
Annex (omitted)  
